Ulric B. and Evelyn L. Bray Social Sciences Seminar

Abstract: Supporting rebel groups fighting an interstate rival can weaken the target government. However, such support also carries the risk that rebels will win the domestic struggle, consolidate power, and emerge as a greater long-term threat to their former patron. How do state sponsors navigate this dilemma? This paper develops a game-theoretic model that formalizes this dynamic trade-off sponsors face. The analysis shows that foreign sponsors strategically calibrate support over the course of a civil war to maximize concessions in their interstate disputes. In particular, sponsors always intervene when rebels are on the brink of elimination. When rebels are close to victory, however, support is conditional: sponsors intervene only if rebel preferences align closely with their own. Otherwise, they withhold support to prevent a rebel takeover. This pattern of support prolongs civil wars by reducing the likelihood of a decisive victory by either side. The paper demonstrates that extended conflict duration can represent a sponsor's deliberate strategy rather than a mere by-product of third-party intervention.