Center for Social Information Sciences (CSIS) Seminar
Baxter 127
Stable Matching as Transportation
Fedor Sandomirskiy,
Associate Research Scholar and Lecturer,
Department of Economics,
Princeton University,
We consider a model of matching with aligned preferences, highlighting the role of supply-demand imbalances in matching markets without money. Preferences are aligned if a matched pair of agents derive equal utility from the match, a condition capturing partnerships among firms, academic collaborations, organ exchanges, and markets with transferable utility and post-match bargaining. We establish a connection between stability, fairness, and welfare in these markets and the theory of optimal transportation. We use this connection to study inherent trade-offs present in these markets and obtain new structural results.
Joint with Federico Echenique (Berkeley) and Joseph Root (Chicago).
For more information, please contact Letty Diaz or by phone at 626-395-1255 or by email at [email protected].